this is bound to raise questions in the minds of foreign holders of U.S. treasury securities that may lead them to search for alternative forms in which to hold their claims. And for the first time in living memory there exists another currency with a deep and liquid market issued by an economy as large as the United States. That currency, obviously, is the euro. Looking forward there is also the renminbi, the currency of an economy that 50 years from now may be even larger economically and trade more extensively than the United States.
History is widely invoked in discussions of this issue, even by currency forecasters who are typically more comfortable with tick-by-tick data than archival sources. Consider the following quote from Avinash Persaud of State Street Bank and Trust. " [R] eserve currencies come and go. Over the past two and a half thousand years there have been over a dozen reserve currencies that no longer exist. Sterling lost its status in the first half of the 20 th century, [and] the dollar will lose its status in the first half of this century…Losing reserve currency status will lead to a series of economic and political crises in the United States." 2 While this passage is exceptional for its drama, it is not unusual for its history. This is not surprising, since a change in the dominant international currency is not seen very often. The last time such a shift occurred, from sterling to the dollar, was more than half a century ago. Moreover, if we focus on one specific role of an international currency, as a store of value for central banks' and governments' international reserves, one can argue that this was the only such shift in recorded history. 3 Other monetary units had come in for international use before, but not as a form in which to hold liquid paper liabilities in connection with the operation of the international monetary system. Most medieval and early modern examples of "international money" were simply coins that circulated for use across national borders. In the 17 th and 18 th centuries when Holland was a leading international commercial and financial power and Amsterdam was a leading international financial center, paper claims became important but most international operations there were in bills on foreign places, not in claims on the Dutch government itself. 4 In the remainder of this lecture I will focus on the dollar's role as the dominant form of official reserves and its place in the operation of the international monetary system. There is a sense, therefore, in which we really have only one data point, the transition from sterling to the dollar, from which to draw inferences. Thus, we are truly in the historian's domain. * * * * As I just suggested, while foreign deposits and purchases of foreign bills and bonds are nothing new, large-scale holdings in foreign financial centers by central banks and governments are a relatively recent development. The spread of this practice coincided with the emergence of the international gold standard in the decades prior to World War I. With a few important exceptions, the standard in question was a gold bullion standard, not a gold coin standard. 5 A significant share of the monetary circulation of countries on the gold standard was not gold coin, in other words, but token 4 See Wilson (1941) and Lindert (1969) . 5 Gold coin constituted a large share of the circulation only in England, France, Germany, the United States, Russia after 1897, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand according to Bloomfield (1959 Redish (1990) and the author's other publications on this subject. 7 See Lindert (1969) . They then rose further, to roughly a quarter of global reserves, in the 1920s, prompting observers to write, with something of a lag relative to reality, of the emergence of a goldexchange standard. 8 According to the famous estimates of Imlah (1958) . 9 Williams (1968), p. 268. imports and re-exports of these materials came the development of commodity exchanges where both spot and forward prices were similarly quoted in sterling.
10
Britain's position as the single most important source of long-term overseas investment worked in the same direction. Foreign governments seeking to borrow abroad came to London, making sterling the logical unit of account for debt securities, since then as now there was a limited appetite for bonds denominated in their own currencies, the markets in which were less liquid and whose value was more easily manipulated by the issuer. 11 When funds became available, it was natural to park them temporarily in deposit accounts in London, generally in the same bank that had underwritten the loan. 12 Lenders encouraged the practice on the view that the maintenance of deposits in London was a bonding device that might promote good behavior on the part of the borrower.
13
That Britain was an imperial power reinforced sterling's role. From the early 18 th century a conscious effort was made to encourage the use of the pound throughout the empire as a way of simplifying and regularizing transactions. 14 British financial institutions established branches in the colonies, and colonial banks opened offices in London. These banks maintained assets and liabilities in London and issued bank notes for the colonies, maintaining a fixed exchange rate between those notes and sterling.
When those exchange rates misbehaved, the British government imposed direct regulation of local currency issues, notably featuring full external convertibility of the local currency into sterling at a fixed rate of exchange, something that was maintained by buying and selling sterling on demand in London. In cases like India where the British sovereign was ultimately made legal tender, the colonial government was led to establish a sizeable reserve in London. World War I had a reinforcing effect. Germany suspended convertibility in the opening week of the war. The Bank of France, which had never been legally obliged to convert notes into gold, did so only under exceptional circumstances before an official gold embargo was imposed in 1915. Britain restricted the export and melting of gold in 20 Lindert (1969) , Table 3 . Note the qualification in the text: these calculations exclude from consideration the $232 million whose currency of denomination is not known. 21 See Broz (1997) . 22 This reflected the absence of a deep and liquid market in bankers acceptances, which was itself a reflection of the fact that national banks were prohibited from accepting bills of exchange arising out of international trade.
1917. The United States, in contrast, preserved gold convertibility even after it entered
World War I, in 1917. 23 Its shares of global trade and foreign lending were then markedly higher in the 1920s than they had been before World War I, leading to a considerable expansion in the dollar's role as a unit of account and means of payment for international transactions between private parties. Germany and France suffered financial turmoil in the first half of the 1920s. In the second half of the decade the Bank of England was continuously "under the harrow," in Montagu Norman's famous phrase.
24
And yet, despite all this, sterling, the dollar, and the franc shared the reserve currency role in the 1920s and 1930s. It is striking that we still lack careful Lindert-like estimates of the relative shares of the three currencies. But sterling was probably still first, followed by the dollar and the franc.
25
The conventional wisdom that one currency dominates reserve holdings worldwide thus derives mainly from the second half of the 20 th century alone, when the greenback accounted for as much as 85 percent of global foreign exchange reserves. (See Table 2 .) In part, the post-World War II dominance of the dollar reflected the exceptional dominance by the United States of global trade and payments in a period when Europe and Japan had not yet fully recovered from the war and modern economic growth had yet 23 In 1914 it induced the New York banks to establish a gold pool for financing balance-of-payments settlements, and after the country entered the war the government appealed to patriotism and erected various modest bureaucratic obstacles to discourage private gold exports. But, fundamentally, it was the strength of the U.S. balance of payments, given the country's status as a leading producer of manufactured exports and raw materials for the war effort, that allowed it to maintain convertibility in this difficult period. 24 Sayers (1976) , p. 211. 25 Triffin (1964) provides an estimate for 1928 of official reserves in dollars of $600 million, versus $2,560 million in other currencies. He estimates the reserves denominated in dollars then fell to $60 million at the end of 1933, with the collapse of the gold-exchange standard, while reserves denominated in other currencies fell to $1,055. Reserves in those other currencies may have been split 70/30 between sterling and the French franc, with a higher fraction probably being held in francs after 1931 when the convertibility of sterling into gold was suspended and the currency was allowed to float. See Nurkse (1944) and Bell (1956) .
to spread to what we now refer to as emerging markets. 26 In addition it reflected the fact that the governments of other potential reserve centers actively discouraged international use of their currencies. Germany saw the internationalization of the deutschemark as a threat to its control of inflation. Japan saw the internationalization of its currency as incompatible with their systems of directed credit. France had seen more than once how allowing private foreign funds to move in also allowed them to move out if investors concluded that the government's macroeconomic policy aspirations were incompatible with its putative commitment to currency stability. These and other considerations led the countries whose currencies were potential alternatives to the dollar to maintain significant capital controls well into the post-World War II period, in some cases until the end of the 1980s. Controls limited the liquidity of their securities markets. 27 Thus, it was not simply the unusually large size of the U.S. in the world economy or the admirable liquidity of U.S. financial markets but the maintenance of controls by other potential reserve centers that explains why the dollar was so dominant in reserves for so long after World War II.
While most of these controls were relaxed or removed by the 1990s, that decade was marked by a slump in Japan and the uncertain transition to the euro, making it an unpropitious time for radical portfolio reallocation. In addition the rapid growth of the Another reason, in addition to loyalty, that members of the Sterling Area were reluctant to more quickly diversify their reserves out of sterling was that they recognized that doing so might aggravate the problems of the British economy, on which they depended as a market for their exports. They valued the exchange-rate and financial stability conferred by the greater sterling area and were reluctant to precipitate its breakup. 29 This position became less tenable following the 1967 devaluation, when capital losses were once more imposed on sterling-area countries. This led to the negotiation of the Basle Facility of 1968 and the associated bilateral agreements in which the UK guaranteed the value in dollars of the official sterling reserves of sterling area countries, in return for which each partner country pledged not to reduce its official sterling balances beyond a certain point.
This observation has inspired confidence in some circles that foreign central banks and governments today will similarly resist the temptation to diversify their 28 Although, as noted by inter alia Schenk (2004) , the colonies did possess a significant and growing amount of fiscal and financial autonomy after World War II, and especially in the 1960s. 29 For discussion of this point see Cohen (1971 Thus, history shows that this cartel, like most cartels, proved impossible to hold together when the need was greatest -that is, when collective action was needed for the maintenance of the system. The same point applies today: the countries of Asia are similarly unlikely to be able to subordinate their individual interest to the collective interest. It may be in their collective interest to hold dollars to keep their currencies down and the dollar up, but it is in their individual interest to get out before the bottom falls out of the U.S. currency. This, then, is a classic cartel problem. And there already are signs that the cartel is fraying around the edges.
33 30 This view has been popularized by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) . 31 As I have argued in Eichengreen (2004) . 32 I argue that the Gold Pool is more relevant than the bilateral agreements negotiated between the UK and the members of the sterling area in the 1930s because the UK guaranteed the value of sterling claims in dollars in return for promises of restrain by sterling area central banks, which greatly shaped the incentive problem. Clearly, a value-maintenance guarantee of this sort is not something that the United States would be prepared to extend today. 33 For some suggestive evidence see Eichengreen (2005 Salant (1966) provides a statement of the view that the tendency of the U.S. to borrow short and lend long reflected the lower costs and greater efficiency of financial intermediation in the United States. The language there is almost identical to the rhetoric currently used to characterize the differences between the U.S. and Chinese financial sectors today. 37 See Feis (1930) , Lindert (1969) and Fishlow (1986) . 38 Arguably, on these previous occasions the reserve currency country was a net lender both on short-and long-term account (Bloomfield 1963 ). In the pre-1914 British case, for example, while the net short-term liabilities of the government and the central bank to their official foreign counterparts were positive, the net short-term liabilities of the country as a whole were probably negative, reflecting the large volume of private acceptance claims on foreigners (again, see Bloomfield 1963) . The same may have been true of France and Germany, although less is known about these cases. 39 Although prewar Britain ran a deficit on merchandise trade, net income from shipping, insurance, interest and dividends were more than sufficient to produce a substantial current account surplus. The other side of this coin was a substantial capital outflow: between 1900 and 1913 Britain invested some 5 percent of her GDP abroad. The country's net foreign assets were on the order of a quarter of GDP. France invested perhaps 2 ½ percent of her GDP abroad each year, and her net foreign asset ratio was perhaps half of (Eichengreen 2000b) suggest that the United States first became a net foreign creditor as a result of World War I, although the size of the net position was small. of the U.S. foreign net asset position circa 1950 put this at some $52 billion, or about 20 percent of GDP. This is why contemporaries and historians were able to refer to the unparalleled pulling power of the Bank of England's discount rate. See for example Smit (1934) . If foreigners began converting sterling reserves into gold -if Britain's liquid external liabilities and assets both began to fall -the country's long-term assets were easily liquefied. In particular, an increase in bank rate damped down, or at least delayed, long-term foreign lending. (In addition, it encouraged overseas and foreign residents floating bonds in London to maintain a larger share of the proceeds on deposit there, as already mentioned. Raising interest rates also raised interest earnings since the country was a net foreign creditor; that is, residents had more interest-earning assets abroad than foreigners maintained in Britain. And, on rare occasion, there was also the possibility of foreign support in the event that the Bank of England's liquid assets proved insufficient, as I have emphasized in Eichengreen (1995) . For an earlier discussion of the same point see Bloomfield (1959) .) It strengthened the balance of payments by contracting the volume of acceptances and other short-term claims on the rest of the world. The classic statement of this view is that of the Macmillan Committee (Committee on Finance and Industry 1931). Bloomfield (1963) provides a more agnostic approach to the question. The U.S. position in the 1960s was more tenuous because of the reluctance of the authorities to use the interest rate to defend the dollar owing to the potentially adverse impact of tighter money on employment and growth, as described in Eichengreen (2000b) . But the government relied instead on taxes and voluntary restraints to discourage direct foreign investment by U.S. corporations, with much the same effect. 40 See Dooley and Garber (2005) .
the timing is wrong: U.S. FDI in China rises starting around 1992, where the massive reserve accumulation comes only a decade later. Given the difficulty of identifying the final holders of U.S. treasury securities, it is not clear that selective default of this sort is possible. And given the fact that the U.S. accounts for only a small fraction of FDI in China, one must assume that the United States would be willing to compromise its public credit standing in this way on behalf not just of U.S. private foreign investors but also of those from other countries. Historically, the way foreign investments in China have been expropriated is through the surreptitious stripping of assets by Chinese managers and joint-venture partners. It is hard to imagine that the U.S. government would risk tarnishing its public credit in response to more such instances. Rather, one has to assume a major geopolitical blow-up between the U.S. and China, a decision by Beijing to freeze all U.S. investments there, and retaliation by the U.S. government in the form of freezing Chinese t-bill holdings. Such events are not beyond all realm of possibility, but they do not strike me as an obvious way of explaining the current pattern of global imbalances.
In my view, the fact that the reserve currency country is running current account deficits and incurring a large net foreign debt threatens to undermine its position as banker to the world. This means that long-term foreign claims on the U.S. are as easily liquefied as long-term U.S. claims on foreigners -even more so to the extent that longterm U.S. foreign assets take the form of illiquid FDI and U.S. long-term foreign liabilities take the form of treasury bonds. While there may be something to the "banker to the world" metaphor, now -unlike Britain before 1914 and the United States before 1971 -we are talking about a bank with a negative net capital.
A modest net foreign debt may not be a problem, given the strength of the American economy and its attractions for foreign investors. The United States has other sources of strength, not merely its financial capital. But if its debt is allowed to grow relative to GDP, sooner or later foreigners will grow reluctant to hold more of it. That reluctance could lead to currency depreciation and inflation in the United States that ultimately makes holding reserves in dollars less attractive.
Michael Mussa (2004) , in a recent analysis, provides a simple way of thinking about this. Mussa shows that the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP, denoted n, stabilizes when c = n * g, where c is the current account deficit as a share of GDP and g is the rate of growth of nominal income. If g is 0.05 (3 percent real growth plus two percent inflation) and c is 0.025, then the debt ratio stabilizes at 50 percent, double the current 25 percent and perhaps the plausible upper bound on how much U.S. net debt foreigners might be willing to hold. (This is also what Mussa assumes, subject to some caveats. It will be useful for what follows to assume that inflation in the rest of the world also runs at 2 percent, the upper bound of the ECB's target range.) 41 Assume now that the United States does nothing to raise its public and household savings rates and that the current account deficit is allowed to continue running at 5 percent of GDP. With g = 0.05 and c = 0.05, the debt ratio now stabilizes at 100 percent. 42 This is a much higher ratio than ever incurred by a large country, much less by a reserve-currency country. It implies that foreigners would have to hold a considerably greater share of their portfolios than at present in the form of claims on the United States.
This result, in other words, is implausible. Something has to give.
One way of squaring the circle, assuming no change in c, which is what we are assuming for the moment, is to raise the rate of inflation from, say, 2 to 7 per cent, with the result that the rate of nominal income growth rises 5 to 10 percent. 43 With c = 0.05 and g = .10, n again stabilizes at 50 percent, which we are assuming to be the upper bound. The most likely way in which this would come about is that foreigners would grow unwilling to add more dollar-denominated securities to their portfolios. Keeping the share of dollar-denominated securities in foreign portfolios constant, even while the U.S. continues to pump additional treasury bonds into the world economy, requires the dollar exchange rate to fall. 44 And once it begins falling, there may be a "rush out of dollars," as investors scramble out in order to avoid ending up holding the bag (that is, to avoid incurring large capital losses as a result of being late). And the faster the dollar drops, the greater are imported inflation and upward pressure on U.S. inflation generally. This is how market forces produce the acceleration in inflation that limits the U.S.
external debt/GNP ratio to levels acceptable to investors.
Some will object at this point that the Fed would not be prepared to countenance such an acceleration in inflation. They have in mind that it would raise interest rates sharply in order to damp down the additional inflationary pressure. But whether this provides a smooth way out of the dilemma at hand depends on how we think the Fed's surprise increase in inflation, which presumably elicits an increase in interest rates, and so forth in a vicious spiral. Presumably this would render the dollar a still less attractive form in which to hold reserves. 43 The assumption that real growth remains unchanged is a convenient simplification to which we may wish to return below. 44 This is the classic portfolio-balance model of international adjustment, as in Kouri (1976). higher interest rates will affect the economy and the current account. Sharply higher interest rates would depress both absorption and output. 45 They would depress consumer spending through their negative impact on house prices and the value of other assets and depress investment by raising the cost of capital. They would depress the growth of output through their negative effects on investment and aggregate demand generally. If the main thing that falls is absorption, then the current account will narrow and portfolio equilibrium can be restored without rapid inflation. But if the main thing that falls is output, then the current account -the current account being the difference between absorption and output -may show little if any improvement. Higher interest rates that depress output may then also destabilize the financial system; after all, the combination of higher interest rates and a collapsing exchange rate, occurring against the backdrop of chronic fiscal and external imbalances, is the classic recipe for a financial crisis.
None of these scenarios have happy endings for the reserve currency role of the dollar. Assume first that the Fed does not attempt to offset the inflationary effects of the fall of the dollar. With U.S. inflation now running at three times inflation in other countries, using the dollar as a store of value and a vehicle and invoicing currency would become less attractive. 46 The resulting capital losses would eventually encourage foreign central banks and governments to find a more stable repository for their reserves. 47 Alternatively, assume that the Fed raises the discount rate sharply in order to prevent an 45 Here is where the assumption flagged in the previous footnote should be relaxed. 46 A point emphasized by Tavlas (1997) . If we instead assume that n must stabilize at 40 percent of U.S. GDP, Mussa's more conservative estimate of the feasible, then U.S. inflation must rise to 10.5 percent, more than five times foreign levels, which only reinforces the conclusion. 47 A complication here is that depreciation of the dollar also has the effect of reducing the U.S. net external debt because U.S. foreign assets are disproportionately denominated in foreign currencies (as in the case, in some sense, of foreign direct investments) while U.S. foreign liabilities are disproportionately denominated in dollars (as emphasized by Gourinchas and Rey 2003 and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2004) . But this too is likely to change in an environment of higher inflation and secular depreciation like that emphasized in the text.
acceleration of inflation. This might only precipitate a sharp recession and financial distress -and potentially an even sharper drop in the dollar. This would again lead foreign central banks and other investors to shift out of dollars to avoid capital losses.
48
Only if we assume that the Fed can engineer a smooth landing -that it could raise interest rates just enough to contain inflation but without precipitating a serious recession and thereby reduce c after all -would there be a smooth way out. * * * * What does this imply for the reserve currency role of the dollar? It implies that whether the dollar retains its reserve currency role depends, first and foremost, on America's own policies. Serious economic mismanagement would lead to the substitution of other reserve currencies for the dollar. In this context, serious mismanagement means policies that allow unsustainably large current account deficits to persist, lead to the accumulation of large external debts, and result in a high rate of U.S.
inflation and dollar depreciation. Clearly, this would make holding dollar reserves unattractive. This is a lesson of British history in the sense that an inflation rate that ran at roughly 3 times U.S. rates over the first three quarters of the 20 th century, in conjunction with repeated devaluations against the dollar, played a major role in sterling's loss of reserve currency status. 48 The possibility that sharp interest rate increases that caused recession and financial distress could weaken the currency rather than strengthening it of course was much discussed in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. See for example Furman and Stiglitz (1998) . The careful reader will have noted that the first scenario has both inflation and currency depreciation accelerating, while the second has currency depreciation accelerating without a concurrent increase in inflation. The reason is that the real exchange rate has good reason to behave differently in the two scenarios; in the second one real depreciation is required to begin crowding in the demand for U.S. goods.
Under the more optimistic scenario in which the U. financial transactions, and to have comparably liquid securities markets. The advent of the euro has done much to increase the liquidity of European bond markets, which is a critical event from the point of view of enhancing the reserve currency status of the euro. 50 The only question is whether the soundness of macroeconomic policies will be maintained in the United States or whether dollar's reserve currency status could be destroyed by an extended bout of inflationary.
The other popular candidates are not likely to be major rivals. Japan is a much smaller country with a serious demographic problem and a resistance to immigration.
Nor has it displayed a record of policy stability in recent years. Everyone's favorite heir to the throne, China, will have to solve some very serious problems before its currency begins to become attractive as a repository for other countries' foreign exchange reserves.
Removing capital controls is the least of its problems, in my view. Its financial markets are not very liquid or transparent; indeed, most of the institutional infrastructure needed for Shanghai to become a true international financial center will take decades to install.
The security of property rights is uncertain, and making investors feel secure will ultimately require a transition to democracy, the creation of credible political checks and balances, and the development of a creditor class with political sway. While the renminbi is everyone's favorite candidate for the new reserve currency champion four or five decades from now, such hopes are, in my opinion, still highly premature.
Thus, my message, appropriate for this venue, is that history must be read carefully. In fact, several currencies can share reserve currency status, as they not infrequently have. Changes in financial technologies and market structures, which weaken network effects, make it even more likely that this will be true in the future than 50 See Pagano and von Thadden (2004) . Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Source: Calculated from Lindert (1969) , Table 3 . Table 2 Source: IMF. 
